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Parenting Advantage in the MNC:  
An Embeddedness Perspective on the Value Added by Headquarters 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
What determines the value an MNC’s headquarters adds to its own affiliates? In this paper, we 
shed light on this question by linking the embeddedness view of the multinational corporation to 
the literature on parenting advantage. We test our hypotheses on an original dataset of 124 
manufacturing subsidiaries located in Europe. Our results indicate that the external 
embeddedness of the MNC is an antecedent to headquarters’ value creation. We find that 
headquarters’ investments into their own relationships with the subsidiaries’ contexts are 
positively related to the value added by headquarters. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger 
when the subsidiary itself is strongly embedded. We discuss implications for the MNC literature, 
embeddedness research, and the literature on parenting and headquarters’ roles.  
 
Keywords: local linkages, embeddedness, parent value added, parenting, headquarters-
subsidiary relationships 
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INTRODUCTION 
Multi-business firms frequently struggle with the question of how headquarters’ staff should 
organize and influence their businesses to create competitive advantages (Goold and Campbell, 
1998; Poppo, 2003; Foss, 1997). Numerous researchers acknowledge that headquarters create 
value through such activities as synergy management, knowledge sharing, and the organization 
of shared services. This is referred to as the ‘parenting advantage’ (Goold, Campbell, and 
Alexander 1994; Goold, Pettifer, and Young, 2001; Foss, 1997). However, research also shows 
that headquarters frequently lack sufficient knowledge and understanding of their subunits’ 
activities for a number of reasons, such as context specificity and limited attention spans (Goold, 
Campbell, and Alexander, 1998; Campbell, Goold, and Alexander, 1995). This, of course, has 
negative consequences for headquarters’ ability to add value (Goold and Campbell, 1998).  
Obviously, such problems expand in situations where headquarters attempt to manage an 
increasingly complex network of subunits (Goold and Campbell, 2002). The multinational 
corporation (MNC) is considered to be one of the most complex organizations due to cultural, 
administrative, geographic, and economic differences that emerge when firms cross borders 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Ghemawat, 2001). Furthermore, MNC subsidiaries often embed 
themselves in their local environments, developing close, intense relationships with local 
partners, such as customers and suppliers. Research has found that subsidiaries can utilize these 
local linkages to foster learning and enhance their effectiveness (Andersson, Forsgren, and 
Holm, 2002). It has been argued, however, that subsidiary embeddedness might make adequate 
value creation even more difficult for parents (Holm, Johanson, and Thilenius, 1995). Few 
insights into how headquarters can add value under such circumstances exist. 
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To address this question, we link two established streams of literature: the MNC external 
embeddedness perspective (see Andersson et al., 2002) and the literature on parenting advantage 
(Campbell et al., 1995; Goold and Campbell, 2002; Goold et al., 1998, 2001; Foss, 1997). In 
accordance with Goold et al. (1998), we define ‘headquarters value added’ as a situation in 
which the headquarters’ influence leads to a level of performance in the subsidiary that is better 
than the subsidiary could have achieved as an independent, stand-alone entity.1 We define 
headquarters as units of MNCs to which subsidiaries directly report. In so doing, we pay tribute 
to corporate reality in larger organizations where parenting is often conducted by intermediate 
units, such as regional headquarters (Goold and Campbell, 2002).2  
We test our hypotheses on an original dataset of 124 manufacturing subsidiaries located 
in Europe. We find support for our hypotheses that headquarters embeddedness in the 
subsidiary’s network is positively associated with headquarters value added and that the strength 
of this relationship increases as the level of subsidiary embeddedness rises. Our results also 
support the views that subsidiaries’ local embeddedness poses a problem for value-creation 
attempts by headquarters and that headquarters refrain from embedding themselves locally in 
situations when doing so seems too costly, especially when a subsidiary operates in 
internationally integrated markets and when it is located far from headquarters. 
Our findings add to the literature in a number of ways. First, we contribute to the 
literature on the embedded MNC (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990). In extant embeddedness research, 
headquarters’ external relationships are often ignored (Andersson et al., 2002). In contrast, our 
results show that a more holistic concept of how the MNC is linked to the external network is 
                                                     
1 Note that we do not investigate MNC-level performance, which would require taking the costs associated with 
headquarters’ operations into account (Collis, Young, and Goold, 2007). We focus on the value created for the 
subsidiary as defined by Goold et al. (1998). 
2 Throughout the remainder of the paper, we use the terms ‘headquarters’ and ‘parent’ interchangeably. 
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valuable. We suggest that the common view of the embedded MNC, in which subsidiary 
embeddedness is viewed rather positively and assumed to be a substitute for headquarters 
embeddedness (Dacin, Ventresca, and Beal, 1999), should be modified. In this regard, we 
provide an explanation for why MNCs’ headquarters and subsidiaries build overlapping 
relationships with the same local partners (Yamin and Forsgren, 2006; Nell, Ambos, and 
Schlegelmilch, 2011; Birkinshaw, Toulan, and Arnold, 2001) despite the fact that the formation 
of such linkages can be very costly.  
Second, we add to the literature on headquarters’ roles (e.g., Ambos, Andersson, and 
Birkinshaw 2010; Poppo, 2003; Goold and Campbell, 2002). Over the past two decades, the 
MNC literature has neglected the role of headquarters or even suggested that an MNC’s 
headquarters is just one unit among many others (e.g., Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2007). In 
contrast, our findings suggest that headquarters still play an important role within the MNC. 
They can add value to their subsidiaries even under challenging conditions by taking on an active 
role, dispersing their locus of activity, and embedding themselves in their subsidiaries’ networks. 
Our finding has therefore a bearing on how we conceptualize (headquarters of) MNCs.  
Third, we add to the scarce literature on parenting (e.g., Collis et al., 2007; Egelhoff, 
2010). In particular, we add a new perspective to what Goold and Campbell (2002) refer to as 
‘parenting in complex structures.’ We suggest that the concept of MNC embeddedness is an 
important attribute of parenting theory, as it helps explain the value added by parents. We 
confirm that complexity does make parenting more difficult. At the same time, we show that 
mechanisms exist to overcome these difficulties. As these mechanisms are costly, parents use 
them selectively. Thus, parenting strategy mediates the relationship between context factors and 
value creation. 
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In sum, our study highlights the need for more research into how MNC headquarters 
behave and how their activities are organized. It also stresses the need to investigate whether 
headquarters should be geographically dispersed and informed by more diverse mechanisms than 
those previously considered to allow for a more active and value-creating headquarters’ role 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Piekkari, Nell, and Ghauri, 2010; Poppo, 2003). 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The MNC can be conceived of as a network of differentiated units that is, in turn, embedded in 
external networks (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990). The external embeddedness of subsidiaries and 
the effects of that embeddedness on the MNC are well researched (e.g., Håkanson and Nobel, 
2001; Andersson et al., 2002, 2007; Boehe, 2007; Dellestrand and Kappen, 2012). This stream of 
research builds on earlier work on the relational view and social networks, which emphasizes 
trust, joint problem solving, and information sharing as key mechanisms that influence the 
success of cooperative relationships (e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
Subsidiary external embeddedness is typically defined in terms of the extent to which a unit has 
developed close relationships with local external actors as opposed to arm’s-length relationships 
(e.g., Andersson and Forsgren, 1996). This external embeddedness has been found to lead to 
increased legitimacy (Luo, Shenkar, and Nyaw, 2002), enhanced subsidiary learning (Mu, 
Gnyawali, and Hatfield, 2007), and a greater likelihood that the subsidiary will serve as a source 
for its sister units’ capability development (e.g., Andersson et al., 2002). Thus, MNCs trying to 
profit from subsidiary learning establish complex organizations in which subsidiaries are 
externally embedded and know-how is transferred from individual subsidiaries to their sister 
units (Asmussen, Dhanaraj, and Pedersen, 2009). 
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Collectively, research on the differentiated MNC and subsidiary external embeddedness 
has provided important insights. However, due to the emphasis on the subsidiary level in the last 
two or three decades, researchers have tended ‘to ignore both the general role of hierarchy and 
the more specific role of a parent HQ in MNCs’ (Egelhoff, 2010: 404). As a consequence, the 
role played by headquarters in this conceptualization of the MNC has become somewhat blurred 
over time (Tallman and Koza, 2010). Some researchers equate the headquarters’ role to that of 
any other unit within the MNC (e.g., Andersson et al., 2007). Others argue that the role of 
headquarters remains unique and distinct (Egelhoff, 2010). In sum, while the subsidiary’s impact 
on firm-level performance has received significant attention in recent years, research into the 
inverse question of how headquarters can add value to their subsidiaries has been rather limited.  
This research gap is potentially problematic, as the answer to this question has a bearing 
on a number of fundamental issues related to MNC management. For example, in situations of 
low headquarters’ value creation, it might be better to reorganize parenting so that fewer 
resources are spent on parenting or so that a different headquarters unit (e.g., regional 
headquarters) can take over parenting activities for particular subunits. Goold and Campbell 
(2002), for instance, found that headquarters’ activities are increasingly being distributed to 
different units. Others have found that they are increasingly internationally dispersed and 
unstable (Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Piekkari et al., 2010). 
 
Headquarters’ roles and value creation 
The most profound insights into headquarters’ value creation build on a stream of research that 
dates back to the work of Chandler (1991) and includes more recent work on ‘parenting’ (e.g., 
Foss, 1997; Collis et al., 2007; Goold and Campbell, 1998, 2002). In general, parents create 
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value through two mechanisms. First, parents ‘[create] value by preventing loss’ (Foss, 1997: 
314). In other words, parents control subunits to ensure that, for instance, opportunistic behavior 
does not become problematic. Second, parents create value through activities such as synergy 
management, knowledge sharing, and the organization of shared services. This has been referred 
to as the ‘positive role of parents’ (Foss, 1997). In this paper, we are interested in this positive 
role. 
A headquarters’ ability to create value for its subsidiaries depends, to a large extent, on 
the managerial abilities of its employees, i.e., the knowledge, skills, and experience of 
headquarters’ staff (Campbell et al., 1995; Adner and Helfat, 2003; Holcomb, Holmes, and 
Connelly, 2009). For example, Goold et al. (1998: 310) note that a necessary condition for value 
creation is that ‘the parent has sufficient understanding of the business.’ Parents that lack 
information and understanding can misjudge the capabilities of subsidiary units, which can lead 
to the transfer of bad practices (Arvidsson, 1999) and synergy bias, i.e., a false evaluation of 
potential synergies (Goold and Campbell, 1998). Thus, Goold et al. (1994: 44) report that a 
headquarters is successful when it ‘(…) spends a great deal of time gathering and processing 
information about the businesses.’  
We argue that headquarters embeddedness in the subsidiary’s local network is one 
important method of gathering and processing information, and that it helps the headquarters 
create value for the subsidiary. Previous research has acknowledged that headquarters maintain 
relationships with external actors (Dacin et al., 1999). Such external ties have predominantly 
been viewed as non-redundant and as substitutes for subsidiary-level external relationships. For 
example, Dacin et al. (1999) refer to globalization as a disembedding process in which the 
relationships of subsidiaries are replaced with higher-level relationships, e.g., at the regional or 
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corporate level. This might be the case, for example, when the MNC responds to their key 
customers’ decision to establish a central purchasing unit by locating key account management 
to the MNC headquarters.  
However, it has also recently been argued that headquarters maintain relationships that 
overlap with the subsidiary’s network (e.g., Birkinshaw et al., 2001; Andersson et al., 2002; 
Yamin and Forsgren, 2006; Holm et al., 1995; Nell et al., 2011). Thus, headquarters apparently 
build selective, direct relationships with partners of the subsidiary in a non-substitutive way, i.e., 
in addition to the subsidiary’s relationships. The subsidiaries’ relationships are probably best 
described as the main business relationships with frequent exchange of information, products, 
and resources (Andersson et al., 2002). The relationships of headquarters to the same actors can 
be characterized as information or communication relationships with less interaction and a lower 
frequency of contact. For example, at the German pharmaceutical firm Boehringer Ingelheim, 
the regional headquarters’ managers have built direct relationships with important national health 
care organizations in their region. Visits to and talks with, for example, the Polish public 
administration, which makes decisions regarding the drugs that will be reimbursed for insured 
patients, helps headquarters’ managers to stay informed about local circumstances, to support 
their subsidiary in negotiations, and to leverage know-how gained from other markets. However, 
the main relationship is held by the Polish subsidiary. 
To this end, we argue that headquarters embeddedness in the subsidiary’s network is 
similar to concepts such as ‘headquarters involvement’ (see Poppo, 2003; Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, and Martin, 2011) and one visible manifestation of 
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the headquarters’ parenting strategy for a particular subsidiary.3 Headquarters investing in local 
embeddedness build external ties that make their staff more involved in the subsidiaries’ 
operative contexts, shape the managers’ work experience (as well as their learning), and convey 
information about the context that augments the managers’ knowledge (Adner and Helfat, 2003). 
The external relationships with the subsidiary context enable the headquarters to develop 
‘domain expertise,’ i.e., an understanding of the context, subsidiary-specific strategies, products, 
markets, task environments, etc. (Holcomb et al., 2009). These relationships also allow for 
augmentation of the headquarters’ cognitive base for decision making, enabling it to avoid overly 
selective perceptions or biases (Adner and Helfat, 2003). Accordingly, Holm et al. (1995) argue 
that headquarters’ own relationships with subsidiary networks increase headquarters’ knowledge 
and understanding of their subsidiaries’ operating contexts. In turn, the increased domain 
expertise makes headquarters’ managers more effective at aligning strategies with the subsidiary 
context and helps them to better understand potential parenting opportunities (Holcomb et al., 
2009). For example, synergy bias and bad practice transfer are likely to be reduced, and 
headquarters are likely to better understand when they should not intervene in subsidiary matters 
(cf. Foss, Foss, and Nell, 2012). The development of headquarters’ domain expertise also 
increases the relevance of the knowledge that headquarters wish to channel to subsidiaries as 
well as the ability of headquarters to help their subsidiaries bargain with external partners. 
Therefore: 
H1: Headquarters embeddedness in the subsidiary’s context is positively associated with 
the value added by headquarters. 
                                                     
3 In fact, empirical corporate strategy literature often features surrogates of actual parenting strategies, such as the 
size of the headquarters (Collis et al., 2007). Furthermore, Collis et al. (2007) argue that the involvement of 
headquarters is one way of characterizing the parenting strategy of the firm. 
     11 
We also propose that the investments a headquarters makes in building and nurturing its 
own relationships with subsidiary partners are more valuable when the subsidiaries are strongly 
embedded, i.e., domain expertise pays off more when the subsidiary itself is strongly embedded. 
The embedding process is described as a development that moves the attention of the embedding 
organization towards the external network (Gulati and Sytch, 2007). Thus, the more a subsidiary 
becomes locally embedded over time, the more its activities, resources, and knowledge become 
oriented towards and specific to the local network, which in turn limits the potential for value-
adding parenting activities. For example, strategic guidance from the parent might not fit the 
local context in such cases (Goold and Campbell, 1998). Furthermore, the embeddedness process 
makes it more difficult for parents to understand the local context (Holm et al., 1995). The 
subsidiaries’ relationships are characterized by the exchange of information, resources, and 
products with the respective counterparts. These relationships evolve with every exchange, 
making it very difficult for relationship ‘outsiders’ to understand developments internal to the 
relationships (Forsgren, Holm, and Johanson, 2005). Holm et al. (1995: 102) conclude that a 
subsidiary’s external relationships might be pretty ‘incomprehensible’ to headquarters. 
Building on this logic, we suggest that a subsidiary that is not strongly embedded 
externally poses a lesser challenge to headquarters’ knowledge and understanding. Similarly, 
such a subsidiary would be less likely to be woven into a complex web of two-way knowledge-
flows. Still, Goold and Campbell (2002: 226) suggest that ‘the parent needs to have a closer, 
more hands-on relationship with the units that report to it’ and ‘the parent needs more 
knowledge of the units, a greater feel for their operations and critical success factors,’ especially 
in such complex organizations. Thus, the improvement in value creation resulting from a 
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headquarters’ investment in local relationships will be smaller when the subsidiary is less 
embedded than when it is strongly embedded:  
H2: The effect of headquarters embeddedness on headquarters value added is greater 
when the subsidiary is strongly embedded. 
METHODS 
Sampling 
The study involves randomly selected European manufacturing subsidiaries of MNCs. 
Subsidiaries are defined as firms that have manufacturing activities, organizational (i.e., non-
financial) shareholders located in a different country with an ownership stake of at least 51 
percent, and more than 50 employees. We concentrate on manufacturing subsidiaries because 
they carry out one of the most important functions and because this focus allows for more precise 
measurement of constructs. Manufacturing subsidiaries, for example, can be assumed to differ 
from pure marketing and sales subsidiaries in terms of their embeddedness. Furthermore, we are 
not interested in organizational units that are strongly oriented towards explorative activities, 
such as R&D units, as research indicates that isolation or only rare inputs from headquarters are 
beneficial to the performance of such units (see, for example, Asakawa, 2001). As we are 
interested in continuous parenting, these units are not appropriate for our study. Note, however, 
that we have not selected our subsidiaries based on considerations related to the level of value 
added by headquarters. 
The AMADEUS database was used to create the sample frame. Data collection, which was 
embedded in a larger research project, was conducted in two stages in 2008. In total, 1,329 
manufacturing subsidiaries received questionnaires. To improve response rates, we conducted 
follow-up calls after the initial distribution of the questionnaire. When requested, we sent the 
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potential respondents a hard copy and/or a pdf of the questionnaire. To estimate the potential 
effects of response bias, we used four-digit serial numbers on the survey instruments, which 
enabled us to keep track of respondents and non-respondents. 126 questionnaires were received 
and 124 questionnaires were used for the main analysis (response rate of 9.3%) due to missing 
values. The subsidiaries belonged, to a great extent, to different MNCs. An analysis of non-
responses showed no substantial differences between the tested sample and the target population 
in terms of subsidiary age and size, although our tests showed a single, marginally significant 
difference between the final sample and the target population in terms of age (means of 25.5 
years and 24.6 years, respectively). Therefore, our sample is slightly biased towards older 
subsidiaries. There is no evidence of late response or data collection bias (via mail with a 
hardcopy document versus via e-mail with a pdf document). 
Our variables show good variance. 44 percent of the subsidiaries belonged to four 
industries and the rest were spread across a number of other manufacturing industries. The four 
main industries were ‘transportation equipment,’ ‘industrial machinery and equipment,’ ‘food 
and kindred products,’ and ‘chemicals and allied products.’ The subsidiaries were located in 
more than 20 countries, with subsidiaries in Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Poland, and 
France making up 44 percent of the sample. Their parents were mainly located in Europe, while 
13 percent had parents located outside of Europe (the United States or Japan). Roughly 38 
percent of the subsidiaries were between 1 and 10 years old at the time of the survey, while 
another 30 percent were between 11 and 20 years old. The number of employees varied notably 
across the sample, with 33 percent of all subsidiaries having between 201 and 500 employees 
and 25 percent with 101 to 200 employees. Average sales were roughly EUR 170 million in 
2007. In order to ensure data was gathered directly from those knowledgeable of the subsidiary 
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as a whole, we aimed to obtain responses from each subsidiary’s general manager. In sum, 85 
percent of the sample is made up of responses from senior executives, such as CEOs and general 
managers. 
Measures 
Headquarters value added. This measure is designed to incorporate important elements of 
headquarters’ value creation. The measurement of value added is difficult because parent staff 
play numerous roles in addition to their value-adding roles (Goold and Campbell, 2002) and 
because it is difficult to find objective measures (Collis et al., 2007). Collis et al. (2007: 399) 
state that ‘[although] the self-reported assessments of effectiveness are prone to error, they have 
the merit of explicitly evaluating corporate headquarters.’ Furthermore, by the time subsidiary 
managers take on a senior post within the local organization, they have usually demonstrated 
significant skill, judgment, and talent, as well as a broad knowledge of their subsidiary. 
Consequently, their perceptions of important issues related to the performance of their subsidiary 
should, on average, correspond relatively closely with objective reality (see McGrath, 2001). For 
these reasons, we use subsidiary managers’ perceptions of the value that their headquarters have 
created. 
Scale development followed a multi-stage process. In a brainstorming session, the 
research team, which consisted of five researchers, created a list of 15 items pertaining to 
headquarters value added. This list was derived from extant headquarters-subsidiary literature 
and exploratory interviews conducted by the team. Subsequently, we sought qualitative feedback 
from experienced researchers from several universities and from MNC managers at different 
levels. Based on these interviews, we created a concise scale with high face validity.  
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Subsidiary managers were asked to indicate their level of agreement with four items on a 
scale from 1 to 5 (α = 0.70): (1) ‘Your parent’s way of challenging your subsidiary’s strategies 
and tactics has improved your local performance;’ (2) ‘Activities managed by your parent have 
relieved your local management from administrative work;’ (3) ‘Your parent’s activities have 
lead to substantial cost savings at your subsidiary;’ and (4) ‘Without your parent, your subsidiary 
would receive less information that is important to your business.’ High values for this variable 
indicate that the headquarters produced high additional value for the focal subsidiary through its 
activities. 
Subsidiary and headquarters local embeddedness. To measure the degree of subsidiary 
embeddedness in the local network, we used an adapted graphical scale based on a similar scale 
used by Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2007). The survey instruments showed a range of possible 
partners in the subsidiary’s external network, including domestic suppliers and customers, local 
units of multinational suppliers and multinational customers, local governments, and local 
industry associations. Respondents were asked to rate the strength of the subsidiary’s 
relationships with each of these types of actors on a six-point Likert-type scale (see Luo, 2001; 
Andersson et al., 2002). Following Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2007), we then derived the final 
measure of average subsidiary embeddedness.  
We assessed headquarters’ local embeddedness in a manner analogous to our 
measurement of subsidiary local embeddedness, i.e., informants were asked to rate the extent to 
which their headquarters maintained linkages to the same partners. This approach proved useful 
in the pre-test to emphasize that the strength of headquarters’ relationships needed to be 
indicated for the same set of subsidiary network partners rather than for the independent 
components of headquarters’ external networks (cf. Nell et al., 2011).  
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Controls. Other factors may influence the value that headquarters can create for 
subsidiaries. We therefore controlled for several control and coordination strategies commonly 
adopted by headquarters, which are discussed by Collis et al. (2007) and in the standard MNC 
literature (Nohria and Goshal, 1997): output control, formal control, central control, and 
socialization. We measured output control using a three-item, Likert-type scale for the 
following indicators, which depict the extent to which headquarters rely on key performance 
indicators for information: (1) ‘Numerical records (e.g., financial ratios) are used as the main 
measure of subsidiary effectiveness by your parent;’ (2) ‘Overall, detailed performance goals for 
your subsidiary are set by your parent;’ and (3) ‘Primary weight on results in subsidiary 
performance is placed by the parent’ (α = 0.70). Formal control was measured using two items: 
(1) ‘Detailed rules and procedures used in your subsidiary are usually developed by your parent’ 
and (2) ‘There are written rules and processes stating how to perform daily business activities’ (α 
= 0.72).  
We measured central control as the degree of centralization of decision making. 
Subsidiary managers were asked to rate the degree of autonomy of their subsidiary with regards 
to a range of decisions on a three-item, five-point Likert-type scale that ranged from ‘subsidiary 
decides 100 percent’ to ‘parent decides 100 percent.’ The items included decisions related to 
investments in a major plant or equipment to expand manufacturing capacity, the formulation 
and approval of the subsidiary’s annual budget, and the increasing of expenditures beyond the 
budgeted amount (α = 0.72). We also controlled for headquarters’ investments into socialization 
(Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). We measured this construct on a four-item scale using the 
following statements: (1) ‘There is a strong commitment to training and developing skilled 
managers;’ (2) ‘Your parent puts a lot of effort into establishing a common corporate culture;’ 
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(3) ‘Your subsidiary executives participate in extensive international training initiated by your 
parent;’ and (4) ‘Subsidiary managers share the values of your parent’ (α = 0.82). 
We used trade flows, which are typically seen as key indicators of industry globalization, 
to objectively characterize the industries in which the subsidiaries were operating (e.g., 
Morrison and Roth, 1992; Makhija, Kim, and Williamson, 1997). For every subsidiary industry 
in each country (as defined by two-digit industry codes), we calculated the extent to which the 
industry was integrated within the EU25 region. This measurement is similar to the measures 
used by Makhija et al. (1997) and Kim, Park, and Prescott (2003).4 To do so, we compiled the 
LIT index (level of international trade) from a number of secondary sources,5 as the key measure 
of industry integration across several markets. The LIT is defined as LIT = (Exports + 
Imports)/Domestic Consumption.6 Furthermore, Ghoshal and Nohria (1993) have presented 
empirical evidence that MNCs pursuing international strategies that are different from those that 
their industries demand suffer from lower performance. Based on this reasoning, we argue that, 
under norms of rationality, our industry variable captures the overall international strategy of the 
MNCs in our sample to a great extent. 
In addition, we controlled for the parenting setup in that we captured whether parenting 
activities were primarily implemented by corporate, regional, or divisional headquarters. Two 
dummies included in our models indicated whether the most important headquarters was the 
                                                     
4 We chose the EU as the relevant geographical dimension for data availability reasons, and because Rugman and 
Verbeke (2004) have shown that the world’s largest firms are region bound. As our dataset is collected randomly, it 
includes many MNCs that are relatively small on a global scale. Therefore, the likelihood that they are region bound 
is higher. For this reason, a regional LIT index is appropriate. 
5 Sources: OECD bilateral trade data, OECD STAN database, UNIDO Industry Statistics database, EUROSTATS 
Prodcomm database, data from GKS (Statistical Bureau of the Russian Federation), and data from the Republic of 
Croatia – Federal Bureau of Statistics. For three subsidiaries, we used the respective country averages, as the 
industry was not defined. Similarly, for three subsidiaries, the country location was omitted by the respondents. For 
these, we used the European averages for the respective industries. 
6 For data availability reasons, we used the related variable of domestic output as the denominator. 
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divisional headquarters or the regional headquarters, leaving the corporate headquarters as 
the baseline. We also included an additional dummy for matrix structure, which was coded ‘1’ 
when the subsidiaries indicated that they reported to more than one headquarters. Multiple levels 
or units might make parent value creation more complex (Goold and Campbell, 2002). 
Moreover, we controlled for a range of subsidiary characteristics. We included subsidiary 
age, as older subsidiaries are generally believed to be more mature and less dependent on 
headquarters. Similarly, the size of the subsidiary can indicate accumulated know-how or 
independence from headquarters. Subsidiary size was measured as the subsidiary’s total sales. 
We use the logarithm of both age and size. We also controlled for a subsidiary’s relative 
competence by constructing a measure based on two items: the subsidiary’s know-how related 
to its key activity of manufacturing relative to the knowledge of that activity held by other 
subsidiaries in the corporation (α = 0.61). The scale ranged from 1 (much below average) to 5 
(much above average). In so doing, we implicitly controlled for parent competences. It became 
clear in pre-tests that respondents could not distinguish between parent competences and parent 
value added. The use of subsidiary competence circumvents this problem. We created another 
dummy variable based on a question in our survey that asked respondents to indicate whether 
their subsidiary was active in all functions of the value-chain: R&D (product development), 
purchasing, manufacturing, marketing and sales, logistics, HR, finance, and stakeholder 
management. When the subsidiary’s activities covered all areas, the dummy variable miniature 
replica was assigned a value of ‘1’ (White and Poynter, 1984). Moreover, we use a dummy 
variable as a control for subsidiary formation (greenfield establishments were assigned a value 
of ‘1’).  
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Finally, following Ghemawat’s CAGE framework (Ghemawat, 2001), we calculated four 
distance measures between the subsidiary’s location and the parent’s location in order to capture 
effects that distance might have on the value added by headquarters. Thus, we calculated 
cultural, administrative, geographic, and economic distance from secondary data sources.7 We 
used Kogut and Singh’s (1988) cultural distance measure. The other distance dimensions were 
computed based on the database compiled by Berry, Guillen, and Zhou (2010). 
 
Common method variance 
We used several procedural and statistical mechanisms to avoid and check for common method 
bias (Chang, van Witteloostuijn, and Eden, 2010; Podsakoff et al., 2003). First, we protected 
respondent anonymity to avoid consistency motif and social desirability. We also used improved 
scale items after extensive pre-testing and validation, and many constructs were based on well-
established scales in the literature (Lindell and Whitney, 2001; Podsakoff et al., 2003; 
Tourangeau, Ripe, and Rasinski, 2000).  
Second, the headquarters embeddedness scale had a special introduction in the survey to 
avoid problems of social desirability. We initiated the question about headquarters’ local 
relationships with a statement indicating that some firms use networks extensively, while others 
do not in order to indicate that both answers were fine.  
Third, we placed some items that were irrelevant for this paper within the questionnaire 
in-between the dependent and independent variables (including the control variables) (see 
Lindell and Whitney, 2001). In addition, the scale for the two embeddedness measures differed 
from the other scales, including the scale for the dependent variable. These steps help to 
                                                     
7 We used the sample mean imputation method for four cases for which we lacked information for either 
headquarters or the subsidiary location. 
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decouple the responses to the different questions and to establish methodological separation of 
our constructs (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Fourth, our model integrates perceptional measures, objective measures (subsidiary size, 
age, formation mode, type of HQ, miniature replica dummy), and secondary data (geographical 
distance, economic distance, administrative distance, cultural distance, LIT). This lessens the 
likelihood of common method variance problems. 
In addition to the procedural remedies, we followed the recommendations in the literature 
and conducted empirical tests to check for common method bias. First, we followed previous 
literature and validated our dependent variable (Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven, 2008). In 
the scale development process, we validated the scale in interviews with subsidiary and 
headquarters’ managers. Furthermore, to check for convergent validity, we correlated our 
measure with an objective subsidiary performance measure (return on assets)8 that we collected 
for 104 subsidiaries. The correlation was positive (r = 0.19) and significant (p = 0.05), suggesting 
that our measure of headquarters value added for subsidiaries and our measure of subsidiaries’ 
objective performance are related. 
Second, Harman’s one-factor tests did not produce a single emerging factor, which is 
evidence against the existence of a single source of variance that is shared among the constructs 
(Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). We also ran five additional factor analyses, combining items for 
the dependent variable with items for different independent variables and controls (see McGrath, 
2001, for a similar procedure). The results showed that the dependent variable’s items never 
loaded on other factors and vice versa. The number of factors was always greater than 1 based on 
the eigenvalue criterion. Furthermore, items from the different constructs separated cleanly and 
                                                     
8 We took the average of the three years before data collection. 
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no item from one particular construct had a significant loading (> 0.5) on a factor associated with 
another construct. 
Third, we validated the independent variable pertaining to headquarters’ parenting 
(headquarters embeddedness) and collected additional data via telephone from some of the 
subsidiaries’ headquarters. We calculated an intra-class correlation coefficient to see whether 
subsidiary- and headquarters-informed responses were strongly correlated. The resulting data on 
120 external relationships showed a high average consistency between subsidiary responses and 
corresponding headquarters responses (Intra Class Coefficient = 0.72). 
Finally, the fact that we are using a complex model with interaction effects makes a 
biased result due to common method variance very unlikely (Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira, 2010; 
Kotabe, Martin, and Domoto, 2003). Siemsen et al. (2010: 470) state that ‘finding significant 
interaction effects despite the influence of CMV in the data set should be taken as strong 
evidence that an interaction effect exists.’ 
In sum, we are confident that common method variance is not of major concern in this 
study. 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
Table 1 presents an overview of the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables 
used in the model. We used OLS regression analysis to test our model. We performed a Cook-
Weisberg test to check for heteroscedasticity which was insignificant. Variance inflation factors 
(all below 2) and bivariate correlations (all below 0.4) indicated no concerns in terms of 
multicollinearity. Residuals were checked for normal distribution.  
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---- Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here ----- 
To test our hypotheses, we estimated three models and used centered variables (see Table 
2). Model 1 contains all control variables, including the subsidiary embeddedness construct. 
Model 1 is marginally significant (p < 0.1, R2 = 0.210), subsidiary age and embeddedness are 
negatively associated with headquarters value added (p < 0.05), and socialization is positively 
associated with the dependent variable (p < 0.05). The results for the control variables remain 
stable across all estimated models with the exception of industry integration (LIT), which 
becomes significant at p < 0.05 in the remaining models. R² jumps to 0.291 in Model 2, which 
integrates the main effect of headquarters embeddedness. Model 2 is significant (p < 0.01), as is 
the increase in R² of 0.081 (p < 0.01). The model supports H1, as headquarters embeddedness is 
positively associated with headquarters value added (p < 0.01). This result remains qualitatively 
stable in the remaining models. In Model 3, the added interaction between headquarters 
embeddedness and subsidiary embeddedness is positive and significant (p < 0.05). Thus, the 
model supports H2. The R² for Model 3 (0.332) is significantly higher than for Model 2 (∆R² = 
0.041; p < 0.05). 
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
Figure 1 illustrates that the effect of headquarters embeddedness is much stronger when 
the subsidiary is strongly embedded, and that the effect of headquarters embeddedness is 
relatively weak and statistically insignificant when the subsidiary is not embedded. The lowest 
absolute headquarters value added is found when headquarters are not embedded but the 
subsidiary is strongly embedded. This is because the effect of subsidiary embeddedness is 
negative, on average. Headquarters can offset this negative effect by embedding itself in the 
subsidiaries’ contexts. Thus, if a headquarters wants to add value to a strongly embedded 
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subsidiary, it can do so by embedding itself in the same context. The threshold-level at which the 
effect of headquarters embeddedness becomes significant (at p < 0.05) lies at a value for 
subsidiary embeddedness of -0.45, which is approximately half a standard deviation below the 
mean. In other words, for all subsidiaries that are above this threshold value, a headquarters’ 
decision to embed locally creates value. Under normal distribution assumptions, roughly 71 
percent of all subsidiaries should lie above the threshold value (in our sample, 67 percent of all 
subsidiaries have higher embeddedness values). This indicates that headquarters embeddedness 
is a valuable tool for the majority of the subsidiaries. 
We conducted robustness tests to validate our results. First, we used an alternative 
approach to capture industry effects and compiled and computed the IIT (intra-industry trade) 
index in addition to the LIT. We used a median split for both variables and constructed four 
industry types (see Makhija et al., 1997, for a similar approach). The multidomestic industry 
dummy was negative and significant (p < 0.05) when compared to the baseline—an integrated 
global industry—and all hypothesized effects remained significant. This is in line with the 
findings derived using the LIT variable as reported in our model.9  
Second, we re-ran models without control variables except for subsidiary embeddedness. 
In a separate test, we controlled for the fact that several subsidiaries are located in the same 
country by estimating robust clusters for subsidiary country as implemented in STATA 11.0. All 
of our hypothesized effects were stable, as were the results obtained from estimations using 
heteroscedasticity-corrected robust standard errors and the results of an estimation that left out 
the industry variable and, instead, controlled for all industries by using robust clusters. 
 
                                                     
9 The model with the three industry dummies did not explain significantly more than the model with industry 
integration (LIT) despite the inclusion of two additional variables. Thus, we opted for the parsimonious model with 
more degrees of freedom. 
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Post-hoc analysis 
Our econometric models show support for a positive effect of industry integration on 
headquarters value added. This is in line with the classical MNC literature, which describes 
integrated industries as environments in which local adaptation pressures are low and where 
headquarters hold strong positions within the MNC network (Bartlett and Goshal, 1989; Harzing, 
2000). In such industries, there are many ways of adding value to subsidiaries, including the 
transfer of proprietary knowledge, the organization of shared service centers, or the offering of 
general strategic guidance. Yet, the extent of industry integration might also have an effect on 
how the headquarters embeds itself. Global industries call for benefits of scale and scope, and 
cost effectiveness is crucial. The costly mechanism of headquarters embeddedness in local 
networks seems to run counter to this principle. Similarly, the geographical distance between the 
headquarters and the subsidiary context makes headquarters’ local embeddedness very 
expensive.  
Low-integration industries, on the other hand, call for a loosely coupled federation of 
rather independent national subunits, with the latter having their main ties with the local 
environment to which they must be responsive (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Therefore, we 
conducted a post-hoc analysis to explore whether these context conditions influence subsidiary 
and headquarters embeddedness, and whether our OLS results still held when we accounted for 
these relationships.  
We employed PLS structural equation modeling (SEM) with one-tailed tests using 
SmartPLS (Ringle, Wende, and Will, 2005). PLS has recently gained popularity in strategy and 
management research (e.g., Gruber et al., 2010; Ciabuschi et al., 2011), and it is appropriate in 
our research context. PLS is a causal modeling approach aimed at maximizing the variance 
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explained in the dependent latent variable. It fits our objective of identifying key drivers of the 
final target construct (headquarters value added) in a multi-step structural model (Hair et al., 
2011). Covariance-based SEM, such as LISREL, is not applicable, as its assumptions are 
violated in our model. Our data set is too small for such a complex model, and some indicators 
are not normally distributed. Under such conditions, PLS often provides more robust estimations 
of the structural model, as it does not require data normality or known distributions (Hair, 
Ringle, and Sarstedt, 2011). 
We estimated a PLS model in which we used our control variables as antecedents to 
headquarters and subsidiary embeddedness, while we also allowed these factors to have a direct 
impact on headquarters value added. We maintained the interaction term for H2 in the model. 
We skipped some control variables that had no influence on either of the endogenous variables 
due to our restricted sample size.10 Table 3 shows the results of the PLS estimation based on a 
1,000 sub-sample bootstrap with sub-sample size of n = 120. 
---- Insert Table 3 about here ----- 
Overall, the variance explained for the endogenous variables is good, ranging between 
0.16 for subsidiary embeddedness to 0.38 for headquarters value added, and Table 3 shows 
several significant relationships. With regards to the effects on headquarters value added, the 
results show that the PLS model produces results very similar to those produced by the OLS. 
Both H1 and H2 gain support, and subsidiary embeddedness is significant, as is industry 
                                                     
10 The rule of thumb for an appropriate PLS sample size is that it should be approximately ten times the largest 
number of structural paths directed at a particular latent construct in the model (Hair et al., 2011). Therefore, we 
estimated separate regressions of all controls on the embeddedness variables and we used the OLS results from 
Table 2 to identify those constructs that did not seem to have an effect on these three endogenous constructs. We 
dropped those constructs—administrative distance, cultural distance, the divisional and regional headquarters 
dummies, centralization, formalization, and output control—from the structural model. Moreover, we did not 
estimate the effects of the miniature replica, greenfield, and matrix dummies on headquarters value added. While 
this approach is more appropriate in terms of sample size, we also tested a model with all control variables, as 
specified in the OLS regressions. The results did not differ substantially, with all hypothesized effects gaining 
support. 
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integration and the other control variables that were at least marginally significant in the OLS 
regressions (socialization, subsidiary age, and economic distance). Geographical distance is not 
directly related to headquarters value added. Therefore, the PLS model shows that our OLS 
results are robust. Furthermore, the results indicate that industry integration and geographical 
distance are negatively related to headquarters embeddedness (p < 0.05). Geographical distance 
has a positive association with subsidiary embeddedness (p < 0.05). Neither the association 
between industry integration and subsidiary embeddedness nor the association between 
geographical distance and headquarters value added are significant. Thus, there is some support 
for the idea that headquarters embeddedness in the subsidiary’s local context partially mediates 
the effect of industry integration11 and fully mediates the effect of geographical distance.  
DISCUSSION 
This study demonstrates that MNC headquarters can serve as a source of value for their 
internationally dispersed subunits and that this positive effect depends on a number of factors. 
With regard to our control variables, we find that younger, more normatively integrated 
subsidiaries profit more from their headquarters. Furthermore, the more a country’s industry is 
linked to other markets, the higher the value added by headquarters. This is in line with the 
classical MNC literature, which argues that high integration implies that the international 
activities of the MNC must be integrated in a manner that develops and sustains competitive 
advantage (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). 
Furthermore, our findings suggest that headquarters embed to differing extents in 
subsidiaries’ environments. These differences help explain why some headquarters add more 
value than others. We argue that headquarters’ investments in their own relationships are 
                                                     
11 Bootstrapping the indirect effect of industry integration on headquarters value added via headquarters 
embeddedness (see Shrout and Bolger, 2002) produced a significant result at p < 0.10. However, our LIT variable 
contains some extreme values. Thus, we need to apply some caution to the interpretation of this variable.  
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positively related to value creation because they increase headquarters’ knowledge and 
understanding of the local context (see Holm et al., 1995) and because they help build domain 
expertise (Adner and Helfat, 2003). The presence of a positive interaction effect between 
subsidiary embeddedness and headquarters embeddedness indicates that these activities are even 
more important when the subsidiary is strongly embedded. 
With these findings, we contribute to several strands of literature. First, we add to the 
literature focusing on different conceptualizations of the MNC, such as the differentiated MNC 
(Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997) or the federative network MNC 
(Andersson et al., 2007). The literature on the differentiated MNC often implicitly assumes that a 
headquarters possesses all of the knowledge necessary to make it a successful orchestrator of the 
MNC’s differentiated system (Forsgren, 2008). Our results indicate that this is a strong 
assumption. We add that while headquarters’ knowledge and domain expertise are critical for the 
success of headquarters in terms of making a contribution to subsidiary performance, this 
knowledge is elusive and might be gained only through costly mechanisms, such as 
headquarters’ local embeddedness. Interestingly, this suggests that parents might be required to 
engage more in external relationships and link themselves to the external context in which their 
subsidiaries are working rather than rely solely on the firm-internal information-processing 
mechanisms for which we control in our model. In this respect, we extend the idea that it is a 
headquarters’ special position within the internal MNC network (its centrality) that determines 
its influence and success, as postulated by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) (cf. Nell et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, the literature on the federative MNC (e.g., Andersson et al., 2002) 
frequently assumes that the headquarters unit is just one unit among others, that it has no special 
role or mandate, and/or that it cannot influence subsidiaries (e.g., Forsgren, 2008). Our results 
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offer limited empirical support for these notions; that is, this assumption only holds when MNCs 
are concerned that operate with strongly embedded subsidiaries and where headquarters’ own 
relationships are neglected. Thus, we argue that the concepts of the differentiated and the 
federative MNC can be reconciled by accounting for previously unexplored mechanisms, such as 
the fact that headquarters develop relationships with local external partners that can overlap with 
subsidiaries’ local networks.  
Second, we contribute to the embeddedness literature. In particular, we extend the 
literature regarding the effects of subsidiary external embeddedness (e.g., Andersson and 
Forsgren, 1996). Most of this literature emphasizes the positive outcomes of embeddedness, such 
as learning and performance effects arising from improved relational mechanisms with partner 
firms (Andersson et al., 2002; Mu et al., 2007). Our findings support the few relatively recent 
studies highlighting that subsidiary embeddedness also entails costs, such as the alienation of the 
subsidiary from the rest of the MNC (e.g., Boehe, 2007; Mu et al., 2007) or the increase in 
subsidiary power vis-à-vis headquarters (e.g., Andersson et al., 2007). To this list, we add an 
important caveat: headquarters appear to experience substantial problems when attempting to 
add value to embedded subsidiaries. Furthermore, the embeddedness literature has focused 
almost exclusively on the embeddedness of subsidiaries (e.g., Andersson and Forsgren, 1996). 
We show that the embeddedness of headquarters is also an important variable and that it is not 
necessarily less relevant when subsidiaries are strongly embedded themselves. This suggests that 
we need to be careful in describing the evolution of the MNC’s external relationships. MNC 
headquarters do not necessarily disembed completely when subsidiaries become mature but they 
maintain relationships that allow for some communication and information exchange directly 
with their subsidiaries’ counterparts. Thus, headquarters embeddedness and subsidiary 
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embeddedness are not necessarily substitutes (Dacin et al., 1999) and our findings suggest that 
using a more holistic embeddedness concept that captures external relationships at different 
levels of the organization could be fruitful for understanding contemporary MNCs.  
Third, we contribute to the parenting literature and the literature on headquarters’ roles. 
Our findings present new evidence supporting recent claims in the parenting literature that 
headquarters’ roles are becoming more involved and hands-on, especially in complex 
organizations (Poppo, 2003; Goold and Campbell, 2002). We argue that MNC headquarters that 
are locally embedded are likely to be more involved in subsidiary matters. Therefore, this study 
connects to recent research reporting that headquarters’ activities are increasingly allocated to 
sets of units at different locations (Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Piekkari et al., 2010). Yamin and 
Forsgren (2006) argue that such relocation allows headquarters to be closer to subsidiary 
contexts so that selective local embeddedness can be achieved. Thus, the parenting of complex, 
dispersed structures might itself become more complex and dispersed. This is a generally 
unexplored area. Our research serves as a first step in understanding this phenomenon, as we 
integrate corporate, divisional, and regional headquarters in our sample. In our study, the type of 
headquarters has no impact on the value added. Hence, no one structural approach appears to be 
superior per se (see Goold et al., 2001). Instead, the headquarters’ managerial abilities and 
domain expertise seem to be important (Holocomb et al., 2009; Adner and Helfat, 2003; Goold 
and Campbell, 1998).  
Furthermore, while we have restricted our research to the investigation of subsidiary-
level performance effects and thus cannot derive conclusions on the ability of parents to create 
net benefits on the corporate level, our findings provide some initial insights into this matter. The 
formation of external linkages to distant, external contexts is costly and these costs usually occur 
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at the headquarters level. Therefore, headquarters are likely to apply heuristics to select 
subsidiaries on which to focus (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008), i.e., the allocation of 
headquarters’ resources to selectively embed locally is based on a number of different subsidiary 
and market characteristics (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Nell et al., 2011). However, the 
parenting literature suggests that headquarters’ attention is often strongly biased (Goold et al., 
1994, 1998), and that headquarters are too optimistic when it comes to assessing and realizing 
synergies between units (Goold and Campbell, 1998). Thus, the net effect of headquarters’ local 
embeddedness could still be negative, i.e., headquarters can destroy value by intervening more 
than necessary due to biased perceptions (Goold and Campbell, 1998; Foss et al., 2012).  
Our post-hoc tests shed some light on this reasoning. In line with previous literature, the 
results support the idea that headquarters embeddedness is driven by a number of factors. For 
example, headquarters are attracted to relatively competent subsidiaries, where they might 
perceive a potential for learning (Nell et al., 2011). Yet, when the subsidiaries are geographically 
distant and when the industry is relatively integrated, headquarters embeddedness in the 
subsidiary’s local context seems to be too costly. Indeed, both variables are negatively related to 
headquarters embeddedness. High industry integration has a positive, direct effect on 
headquarters value added but it suppresses the positive effect of headquarters embeddedness. 
Similarly, geographical distance reduces value creation by headquarters for their subsidiaries 
through two distinct mechanisms. On the one hand, it is related to higher subsidiary 
embeddedness, which makes headquarters’ value creation more difficult. On the other hand, it 
lowers headquarters embeddedness in the local network, which removes the mechanism that 
would allow headquarters to add value to the embedded subsidiary. In sum, there is evidence that 
MNC headquarters try to match their parenting strategies to the context, i.e., headquarters adapt 
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their parenting strategies to the outcomes of a cost-benefit analysis, and that they accept that 
some subsidiaries might not significantly profit from them when overcoming the barriers to 
value creation is too costly. Thus, the headquarters’ parenting strategy mediates the relationship 
between the overall context (e.g., industry integration and geographic dispersion) and parenting 
success, at least partially.  
 
Limitations and future research 
Of course, our study suffers from some limitations. First, future research could investigate 
potential differences across different parenting structures in a more fine-grained way, perhaps by 
shedding more light on how multiple parents jointly add value to the subsidiary. Such research 
could investigate differences in coordination tools and specific parenting activities handled by 
different elements of a complex parent that includes intermediate headquarters, such as regional 
headquarters.  
Second, additional scholarly attention might be paid to the link between headquarters 
embeddedness and headquarters’ value creation. We do not explicitly capture specific value-
creating activities, such as the transfer of proprietary knowledge. Rather, we argue that 
headquarters embeddedness is an input mechanism for successful parenting, as it is a source of 
knowledge and domain expertise. This logic could be explicitly tested using a more specific 
parenting strategy measure. 
Third, our findings shed some light on the links between context, parenting strategy, and 
parenting outcomes on the subsidiary level, but future research could include MNC-wide 
outcomes (e.g., MNC performance) as dependent variables. This would be very valuable, albeit 
highly complex, as it would presumably require multi-level investigations that take the positive 
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effects of parenting into account while considering the costs associated with such relationships 
occurring at relatively aggregated levels (see Collis et al., 2007). 
Finally, our measure of headquarters value added is subjective and, therefore, biased to 
some extent. However, we believe that senior subsidiary managers do acknowledge when the 
headquarters creates value and that the extent of bias due to subjective measurement is usually 
low when it comes to objective issues (Spector, 1992). Our items reflect actual, objective value 
created by the headquarters, such as cost savings and improvements in strategy. This is also 
shown by our further validation of the dependent variable with objective performance data. 
Nevertheless, research on headquarters value added would benefit from the definition and 
compiling of objective measures. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we believe that this research enhances our understanding of MNC headquarters, 
their roles, and the conditions under which they add value to their subsidiaries. We drew on the 
MNC embeddedness view (e.g., Andersson and Forsgren, 1996) and the literature on parenting 
(Goold and Campbell, 2002) to test the isolated and joint impacts of subsidiary and headquarters’ 
external embeddedness on headquarters value added. We showed that both subsidiary and 
headquarters embeddedness are driven by a number of factors, and that they jointly help to 
explain headquarters value added.  
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Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and correlationsa 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 Matrix organization 1.000 
2 Main headquarters 
is regional HQ 
-0.132 1.000 
3 Main headquarters 
is divisional HQ 
0.048 -0.347 1.000 
4 Socialization 0.089 0.064 -0.047 1.000 
5 Output control 0.047 0.043 0.144 0.181 1.000 
6 Centralization -0.054 0.076 0.080 0.014 0.250 1.000 
7 Formalization 0.001 0.047 -0.094 0.208 0.204 0.146 1.000 
8 Subsidiary relative 
competence 
-0.062 0.092 0.062 0.065 0.094 0.042 0.065 1.000 
9 Value added -0.020 -0.012 0.013 0.215 0.017 0.067 0.140 0.000 1.000 
10 Industry integration 
(LIT) 
0.040 0.161 -0.059 -0.032 0.009 0.121 0.053 -0.054 0.170 1.000 
11 Greenfield dummy -0.002 0.214 -0.049 0.017 -0.144 0.091 0.030 -0.043 0.054 0.212 1.000 
12 Subsidiary age -0.101 0.126 -0.048 -0.031 0.038 0.174 -0.077 -0.003 -0.210 -0.116 0.153 1.000 
13 Subsidiary size 0.084 0.172 -0.058 0.073 -0.107 0.069 0.037 0.116 -0.048 -0.122 0.150 0.194 1.000 
14 Miniature replica 0.047 0.011 -0.132 0.079 -0.164 -0.155 0.029 -0.101 0.016 -0.085 -0.106 -0.190 0.048 1.000 
15 Cultural distance 0.080 0.097 0.004 0.091 -0.125 0.177 -0.032 -0.083 0.046 0.351 0.149 -0.159 -0.016 0.034 1.000 
16 Subsidiary 
embeddedness 
0.212 -0.017 -0.034 0.092 -0.010 -0.061 0.118 0.005 -0.221 -0.099 0.090 0.035 0.225 0.170 -0.078 1.000 
17 Administrative 
distance 
0.101 -0.074 0.104 0.030 -0.013 0.064 -0.099 -0.111 -0.059 -0.064 0.049 0.058 -0.028 -0.003 0.207 0.073 1.000 
18 Geographic distance 0.103 -0.111 -0.020 -0.178 -0.059 0.118 -0.047 -0.027 -0.136 0.080 -0.110 -0.028 0.015 0.007 0.019 0.159 0.010 1.000 
19 Economic distance -0.018 0.027 0.069 0.090 -0.007 0.101 -0.086 -0.118 -0.063 0.041 -0.025 -0.262 0.122 0.088 0.229 0.083 0.130 0.114 1.000 
20 HQ embeddedness -0.009 0.095 -0.099 0.242 -0.028 -0.060 0.179 0.226 0.336 -0.150 0.043 -0.165 -0.026 0.114 0.019 -0.032 -0.043 -0.221 0.038 1.000 
 Mean 0.198 0.317 0.206 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.246 2.701 4.053 0.714 1.256 0.000 142.1 1725.0 5.85 0.000 
 S. D. 0.400 0.467 0.406 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.710 0.432 0.991 1.424 0.454 1.085 0.801 97.9 2440.0 8.21 1.102 
a) Correlations with n = 124. Descriptives are based on all available observations. Average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) = 1.27. 
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Table 2: Results of OLS regression models – dependent variable: headquarters value addeda 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 0.747 (0.456) 0.569 (0.437) 0.565 (0.426)
Matrix organization -0.047 (0.231) -0.077 (0.220) -0.091 (0.215)
Main headquarters is regional HQ -0.094 (0.214) -0.136 (0.205) -0.113 (0.200)
Main headquarters is divisional HQ 0.061 (0.241) 0.125 (0.230) 0.143 (0.224)
Socialization 0.237 (0.095)* 0.184 (0.092)* 0.192 (0.090)*
Output control -0.057 (0.100) -0.029 (0.095) -0.041 (0.093)
Centralization 0.112 (0.098) 0.113 (0.094) 0.092 (0.092)
Formalization 0.071 (0.095) 0.024 (0.092) 0.015 (0.090)
Industry integration (LIT) 0.090 (0.058) 0.129 (0.056)* 0.135 (0.054)*
Greenfield dummy 0.140 (0.225) 0.071 (0.215) 0.003 (0.211)
Subsidiary age (logged) -0.255 (0.104)* -0.210 (0.100)* -0.194 (0.098)*
Subsidiary size (logged) 0.038 (0.068) 0.062 (0.065) 0.082 (0.064)
Subsidiary relative competence -0.034 (0.090) -0.110 (0.089) -0.129 (0.087)
Subsidiary embeddedness -0.270 (0.120)* -0.250 (0.114)* -0.243 (0.111)*
Cultural distance -0.079 (0.095) -0.088 (0.090) -0.087 (0.088)
Administrative distance -0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
Geographical distance -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Economic distance -0.015 (0.012) -0.018 (0.011) -0.021 (0.011)+
Miniature replica 0.060 (0.208) 0.010 (0.198) -0.028 (0.194)
H1: HQ embeddedness  0.302 (0.088)** 0.310 (0.086)**
H2: HQ embeddedness x subsidiary embeddedness 0.253 (0.101)*
F 1.55+  2.25** 2.56**
R²   0.210 0.291 0.332
Adjusted R² 0.075  0.161 0.202
∆R²    0.081 ** 0.041*
a) n = 124. Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (2-tailed). ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.  
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Table 3: Post-hoc analysis: PLS path estimates and R² of endogenous constructsa 
 
  Path Coefficients 
Effects on headquarters embeddedness (R² = 0.223) 
Industry integration (LIT) -0.155 * 
Geographical distance -0.160 * 
Subsidiary age (logged) -0.154 * 
Economic distance 0.031   
Greenfield dummy 0.103   
Matrix structure 0.001   
Miniature replica 0.092   
Subsidiary size (logged) -0.074   
Socialization 0.220 ** 
Subsidiary relative competence 0.247 ** 
Effects on subsidiary embeddedness (R² = 0.159) 
Industry integration (LIT) -0.106   
Geographical distance 0.168 * 
Subsidiary age (logged) 0.046   
Economic distance 0.050   
Greenfield dummy 0.117   
Matrix structure 0.180 * 
Miniature replica 0.157 * 
Subsidiary size (logged) 0.149   
Socialization 0.076   
Subsidiary relative competence 0.017   
Effects on headquarters value added (R² = 0.384) 
Subsidiary embeddedness -0.221 ** 
H1: headquarters embeddedness 0.298 ** 
H2: headquarters embeddedness x subsidiary embeddedness 0.193 * 
Industry integration (LIT) 0.201 * 
Geographical distance 0.022
Economic distance -0.160 * 
Subsidiary size (logged) 0.107   
Subsidiary age (logged) -0.161 * 
Socialization 0.330 ** 
Subsidiary relative competence -0.088   
 
a) ** < 0.01; * < 0.05 based on a Student t distribution with one tail (1,000 sub-sample bootstrap with n = 120). 
 
